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Bebate on MEK

 
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Ramin Etebar,MD



Joined: 21 May 2004
Posts: 74
Location: USA

PostPosted: Sun Jan 29, 2006 1:41 am    Post subject: Bebate on MEK Reply with quote

Amir Jaan

Inha ghabl az inkeh akhoondha ro bokoshan tartib e man o tu nationalist ra midan!!!!
Entekhaabaat? Ba ray dadan mikhay be jang terroristha beri? Democracy? Jameh e bitabagheh tohidi?
Dictatori e poroltaria? Vel koon Amir haal nadari!!!
Beh nazar e man inha Irani nistand keh be Iran baz gardand,shayad bad az inkeh maa tartib e akhoondha ra dadim, MEK
Zed e maa beh khedmat e Moqtada Sadr dar biaan! yadet basheh keh gorg-zadeh aaghebat gorg shaved, in haa ham
Bacheh akhoondand! Pas behtareh keh dar Iraq bemaanand!

RE

________________________________________
From: Amir Khosrow [mailto:]
Sent: 28. jaanuar 2006. a. 20:35
To: Ramin Etebar, MD
Cc: MajidSaatchi@aol.com
Subject: Re: Mujahedin-e Khalq (MKO or MEK)


Baba, Ramin. Rast Migheh, velesh kon. Mageh ma ba ki daram mijangeem?

Vaseye har yek kotaki ke ma tosar mikhoreem, eenha se-ta mikhoran.

Agar ghabooldaran raye aksariat digar chi bishtar mitoneem bekhahim. Az vaghti-ke man 12 salam bood, mojahed-ha ra tooye khiyabanha-ye sard va tareeke Landan meedeedam, ba aks-e doostaneshoon ke mordand. Magar misheh inha ra zeere ghali ghayem kard. Inha ham sadame khordan (shayad bekhatere eshtebahate khodeshoon). Agar Rajavi eshtebahi kardan, be rejal mojahedeen chikar dareh?

Ba komake Aragh jangidan? Khob Komonista ham ba komake Rossiyeh jangidan. Sata Amir va khan ham ba komake Engilisiha kerm rikhtan. Maham meebeenim oonha-i ke mikhan ba komake Amrika beran be jang.

In harfa vaseye fati tomboon nemishe. mogheye entekhabat mitooni in harfha ra bezanid. felan een akhoonda-ye vahshee va mordeh khor, oonja neshestan va tamasha mikonand maha-ro ke ba ham mijangeem va mikhandand.


Amir Khosrow



On Jan 28, 2006, at 11:09 PM, Ramin Etebar, MD wrote:

Baa doshmanaan e Iran, Akhoond, MEK, Imperialism, spies, traitors, treasonous elements etc!
Zereshk! Jangidan beh nafa Sadam zed Iran, koshtan e Sarbazaan e vazifeh dar forogh e Javidan ya koshtaar kurdhay e Iraq?
You got it!
KHILI BAYAD AZ SABRE ENGHELABI MAA ESTEFADEH KARDEH BASHI
Mesl e Sadam Houssein?
RISHE AKHONDO 2 DASTI CHASBIDIM
Hamin jar o bahs baa shoma yekish!!!!
MOJAHEDIN 120 000 SHAHIDE RAHE AZADI 500 000 SHEKANJEH SHODEH + HIZARAN TAZAHORAT VA HOZOR DAR DAR HAR MAYDANI BA TAMAME GHOVA
Khomeni, Etehaad jamahir o shoravi ,Sorieh, Liby ya Sadam Houssein?
MAN YK HAVADARE KOCHAKE INN MOGHAVEMAT HASTAM ANCHEH KEH TAVANESTAM AZ KHODAM VA KHANIVADEH 9 NAFARI FADAI AZADI IRAN KARDAM DAR MASIRE MOJAHEDIN KEH BE VAGHE TANHA RAHH BODEH KEH BARAYAM VAGHAEI BODEH
Bah jay e inkaarha beh daamaan melat baz gardid, poozesh bekhahid o beh mobarezaan vaghei beh payvandid!
Maa ham hamin tor!!!!
Aghaa Jaan

Tatil konid in basaat khod va mardom faribi raa!!!

Bringing the god damn Khomeini to power was MOIS work or CIA & MI6? Would you like me to send you the pictures of your street fighters
from the 22 Bahman 1357 or aks haye sharafyabi Rajavi va Khiabani beh pishgaah DAJAAL?

Espionage for the Soviet Union, Sadam and US was the works of MOIS?
Fighting against Iran on behalf of Sadam, killing Iraqi Kurdish freedom fighters is labeling? BARCHASB HAI AKHOND SHAAD KOON???

You guys are nothing more than Matarsak sar e Kharman zed e akhondhaa dar dast e America! Do you think they will forget or forgive you for assassinating
their citizens in Iran in the early 70s?

cheh havadaar e mojahedi? Read my report from New York’s demonstrations for Antarinejad’s visit to UN:

The trip to New York

I was par of a 60 people group flying from Los Angeles to NYC together on a red eye flight. Prior to the departure while getting a bite to eat with couple of friends, we ran into a group of college aged individuals who informed us that they were also attending the demonstrations in New York City. To my amazement out of 22 people in the MEK group,only 3 were Iranians. Further chatting with them revealed that they were paid $400.00 per person in addition to Hotel accommodations in Manhattan for three days, topped off by food allowance and site seeing tours in NYC. The Funny thing was that most of these kids did not know which organization has sponsored them although some had attended a previous demonstration in Washington DC.
The next day while demonstrating I noticed a tremendous number of non-Iranians demonstrating among the MEK group. Two Danish gentlemen approached me asking for a cloth Iranian Sun and the Lion flags since MEK had provided their group with a paper one. They too had been flown from Denmark all expenses paid!
Next I ran into Mr. Kenneth R. Timmerman notifying him of the situation. Mr. Timmerman carried his own investigation, took some picture and wrote this article: Outlawed Iranian opposition group rents demonstrators in New York; pro-monarchist groups call for Ahmadinejad arrest
http://marzeporgohar.org/index.php?action=news&n_id=25082&l=1
I would like to extend my most sincere appreciation to my travel companions.
They are hard working, patriotic people who took time off work, attended the demonstrations paying their own way. They were both republicans and Monarchists!

I’ll be happy to provide you with pictures upon request!
Forget about being a US chosen alternative for Mullahas! Iran of tomorrow belongs to NATIONALISTS not pseudo-Akhoond/ pseudo-Marxists!

Down with IRI and Islamofacism!

RE

________________________________________
From: MajidSaatchi@aol.com [mailto:MajidSaatchi@aol.com]
Sent: 28. jaanuar 2006. a. 17:28
To: retebar@cox.net
Subject: Re: Mujahedin-e Khalq (MKO or MEK)

CHI BAYAD GOFT KEH TAA HALA NAGOFTEH MANDEH

VEZARATE ETELAAT VA MOMASHAT BA INN REGIM BONYAD GAARA HARCHEH TOHMATE NARAVA BOODEH BE IN MOGHAVEMATE SARFARAZ ZADEHAND

MARDOMI KEH DAR PAYE AZADI IRAN HASTAND GOSHESHAN BE INN BARCHASB HAI AKHOND SHAAD KOON NIST

KARESHONO MIKONAND

BA HAMEH CHIZE KHOOD VAREDE MAYDANE MOBAREZEH SHODAND

VA MAN VA SHOMA VA HAMEH MIDANAND KEH HICH KOMAKI BE IN AKHOND HAA NIMITAVANAD AZ SARNEGUNI INN REGIM JOLO GERI KONAD

FAGHAD MITONAN AGHAB BINDAZAN SARNEGUNI RAA

TAA YK HAVADARE MOJAHID HAST RAHE SARNEGUNI INN REGIM BA SHETAB PISH MIRAVAD

Why MEK is repulsive to the Iranians?
MEK is a Islamic-Marxist terrorist organization established in 1965. In early 70s they assassinated at least at least six American citizens who were employees of Rockwell and other defense contractors in Iran.
In 1960s and 70s they were spying for the Former Soviet Union against Iran as well as committing acts of sabotage and assassinations. In 1979 collaborated with Ayatollah Khomeini to overthrow the former Shah of Iran. They supported the US Embassy take over and taking of the American diplomats hostage. Soon after the revolution they lost the power struggle and were purged by Ayatollah Khomeini in the early 1980s. MEK then sided with Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war by 1985.In 1988 they launched a foolish attack on the Iranians borders that was swiftly defeated by the Mullahs. As a result of this foolishness, many MEK personnel and Iranian conscript soldiers were killed. This gave the murderous IRI regime to execute more than 30,000 Iranian political prisoners in matter of weeks in the summer of 1988. They were mostly leftist political prisoners.
In 1991 after the first Persian Gulf War, MEK fighters were on the front lines of Saddam's brutal counterinsurgency campaigns in the Shiite south and Kurdish north. "Up until the fall of the Saddam’s regime, they were heavily involved in suppressing the Kurdish uprising of 1991. Page. 321 of the SSIC report on pre-war Iraq intelligence makes crystal clear, the Iraqi regime provided bases, training, protection, and funding to MEK and in return the group helped Saddam with his "internal security." In addition to occasional acts of sabotage, the Mojahedin are responsible for violent attacks in Iran that victimize civilians.
The Supreme leader of the MEK, Massoud Rajavi escaped from Iran disguised as a woman; leaving his wife behind. His first wife along with her brother was shortly killed by the IRI regime in a gun fight. Shortly thereafter Rajavi married the daughter of Banisadr (The first IRI president) who had escaped from Iran in the same manner with Rajavi.Rajavi later on seduced his comrade’s (Mehdi Abrishamchi) wife Maryam , divorced his second wife and married Maryam Rajavi who is the MEK selected President for Iran. This they called a revolution, what kind? Probably a bedroom one! MEK at the same time being a cult that is; pressures its members to divorce their spouses and families! When Maryam came to Europe in 1993 her husband had an affair with her second in command, Fahimeh Arvani back in Iraq.
In June 2005, Human Rights Watch published a report about mistreatment inside the Mojahedin-e Khalq, identifying torture and assassination as being used to stop disaffected members from leaving the organization.
The Us department of state report describes MEK’s popularity among iranian in this manner: “Since their leadership's expulsion from Iran, the Mojahedin have conducted a public relations campaign among Western press and public officials, seeking political support and financial backing. Exploiting Western opprobrium of the behaviour of the current government of Iran, the Mojahedin posit themselves as the alternative. To achieve that goal, they claim they have the support of a majority of Iranians. This claim is much disputed by academics and other specialists on Iran, who assert that in fact the Mojahedin-e Khalq have little support among Iranians. They argue that the Mojahedin's activities since the group's leadership fled from Iran in 1981-- particularly their alliance with Iraq and the group's internal oppression -- have discredited them among the Iranian polity. The clerical regime in Tehran, aware of the Mojahedin's unpopularity, attempts to discredit many of its opponents by falsely linking them to the MKO. The Mojahedin, for their part, often dismiss their critics as "agents of the regime”.
Aside from the above, MEK is also hated for previously burning the Iranian Sun and the Lion flags, and cult behavior including committing suicide by setting themes on fire. Several people died when in protest of Maryam’s arrest in France, several cult members set themselves on fire where in contrast to the execution of the 30,000 political prisoners (many of whom were MEK members) they did nothing. “When Maryam Rajavi was arrested in Paris in June 2003, and her premises were searched, she was found to possess millions of dollars from Iraq and not surprisingly about a million Euros worth of clothes, shoes and make-up. Observers were shocked by the contrast between her personal wealth and the way she and her husband Massoud Rajavi treat the cult members who are not allowed personal possessions, sleep in communal dormitories sometimes 10 to a room and whose children are used to collect money in the streets. For years the Rajavis have been using these members as slaves, and have, in addition, been paid per head by Saddam to add to their personal wealth” reported by Iran Interlink.
Conclusion
Any kind of US support for the MEK as an organized Iranian opposition would be a complete and utter disaster for any kind of movement for democratic revolution inside Iran. It would give the mullahs a propaganda victory that they would relish for years to come and completely discredit any legitimate pro-democracy groups that accepted US support. As far as the Iranians are concerned MEK can take its terror (TRAITOR) organization, its ideology and shove it where the sun does not shine!
Dr. Ramin Etebar
Khavaran Cemetery, a resting place for the joint victims of IRI & MEK
These pictures are from Khavaran Cemetery, where some of the "undesirables", the victims of mass executions in Iran, mostly from leftist political leanings are buried. This includes the victims of mass murders in Summer of 1988. I recently came across another group of pictures from the same cemetery, showing families visiting the graves of their loved ones, where no markers or headstones are allowed and often only a single flower or a picture points to where the remains of their son, daughter, husband or mother was buried. The larger plots hide the mass graves, where even the dignity of a separate burial was denied the victims.
Their memories will live forever in the hearts of many Iranians.
Spring and summer of 1988 is a period of great significance for those interested in Iran's modern history. Three sequential and important events took place during this time, starting with a cease-fire after an 8 year war with Iraq.
Saddam Hussein had started a war with Iran in 1980, with full support of the West and with fantasies of an easy victory over a non-existent army battered by dismissals, executions and escape of most of its upper decision-makers following the Iranian revolution of 1979. His dream and the dream of his backers were quickly shattered when untrained and often unarmed grassroots resistance forces of largely ordinary Iranians stopped the invasion headed by his advanced and well-armed army. The first two years of the war is full of heroic and incredible stories of battles that eventually led to pushing the Iraqi army all the way behind the international borders.
However, Khomeini, Rafsanjani and others at the top, refused to stop the war at this point, despite several offers by Saddam and his supporting neighbors to pay restitution, accepting culpability for the war and advice of top military experts. They announced that the war shall continue until the fall of Saddam and thus pulled the country into an additional 6 years of unnecessary and disastrous war costing billions with over a million dead and injured. The war was now an ideological and religious campaign and not a nationalistic and defensive effort of Iranian people. Finally in 1988, Khomeini accepted that his pursuit of “regime change” was unrealistic and as he put it; he drank the “goblet of poison” by accepting the ceasefire.
This prompted the second event of that period. Mojahedin e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO) who had spent the last few years under the protection of Saddam’s regime, saw the end of the war as either their opportunity to deliver a knockout blow to the battered Iranian regime, or felt their existence may now be in jeopardy without the cover of the war. For whatever reason, they started a massive campaign by gathering their full force at the Iranian border and in a military strike that lasted several days, tried to advance towards Tehran. MKO’s forces only managed to seize a small parcel of Iranian land and were severely beaten, suffering heavy casualties and major embarrassment for their foolish plan.
However, what came next was the event I have such a difficult time writing about. Whether the MKO offensive was the catalyst for a long overdue revenge, the fear of political prisoners still in custody becoming a resistance force in the future, or an excuse had been created to implement a previous plan, the regime decided to clean up its prisons after quashing the MKO offensive.
The number of political prisoners in Iranian prisons had exploded right after the MKO and other left organizations became targets of the regime in 1981. As the number of prisoners decreased, mostly due to nightly mass executions, regime found new enemies to supply a fresh crop all the time. Prisoners were tortured regularly and would at one point be granted a “trial” at which no lawyer defended them, prosecutor was also the judge and juries were never invited. Those who had proven connections to now outlawed groups were almost definitely sent to the firing squads. Others were given long sentences, usually between 10 to 30 years and often for no evidence but having a banned book, being related to “an infidel” or just being accused by a trusted friend of the system.
In the last two months of the summer of 1988, these “convicted” prisoners became the new targets again. A committee of three clergy was selected by a direct order of Khomeini to review all cases and decide once and for all as to the fate of each prisoner. There was no due process, no appeals and no defense council. All decisions would be final and carried out immediately.
The “judges” had three standard questions for each group or organization the prisoner was accused of helping. Basic questions like “are you Muslim?”, “do you practice your religious chores regularly?” and “do you accept the rule of the Supreme Leader?”. Answering negatively to any of the 3 questions asked would result in an automatic death sentence. Even positive answers caused a “judgment call” as to see if the clergy present believe the accused and even if they did what should the new sentence be.
There are no definitive numbers, but all evidence point to thousands, maybe even tens of thousands of executions within those two short months. The volume became so heavy, new executioners had to be recruited and then instructed to not use bullets, as the costs associated with buying ammunition through black market was too high. Places like the large prayer hall in dreaded Evin Prison were transformed into hanging galleries.
Mass executions were not new to this government, but two factors sets this particular set aside: 1) For the first time, the injustice evident to most opponents was clearly displayed to the world by executing prisoners already convicted and while serving their sentences where no new “crime” could have been committed and none presented a threat to the regime. 2) The executions went across all opinion and ideological barriers and included almost all groups present at the recent political landscape of Iran.
I lost many friends that summer. In fact of the group of about 30-something student activists functioning within my high school, I only know of 2 others who have survived past the summer of 1988.
Buried in unmarked spots and unknown mass graves, the victims of 1988 massacres won’t be forgotten and will always serve as a reminder of how low we humans can sink and how hate and fundamentalist view of the world based on ideologies and religions can divide people and portray us as anything but similar creatures only separated by ideas, cultures and geography.
These are the unmarked graves of men and women who fought the Tyranny:




Human Rights Abuses Inside the Mojahedin Khalq Camps
I. Summary
The Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO) is an armed Iranian opposition group that was formed in 1965. An urban guerrilla group fighting against the government of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, it was an active participant in the anti-monarchy struggle that resulted in the 1979 Iranian revolution.1
After the revolution, the MKO expanded its organizational infrastructure and recruited many new members. However it was excluded from participating in power sharing arrangements, and the new revolutionary government under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini forced it underground after it instigated an armed uprising against the government in June 1981. The majority of its top cadres went into exile in France. In France, the MKO continued its active opposition to Iran’s government. In 1986, under pressure from the French authorities, the MKO relocated to Iraq. There it established a number of military camps under the banner of the National Liberation Army and maintained an armed presence inside Iraq until the fall of Saddam Hussein’s government in 2003.
During the Iran-Iraq war, the MKO fighters made regular incursions into Iranian territory and fought against Iranian government forces. After the end of Iran-Iraq war, the group’s armed activities decreased substantially as Saddam Hussein’s government curtailed the MKO’s ability to launch attacks inside Iranian territory.
The fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in April 2003 put an end to Iraqi financial and logistical support of the MKO. The MKO fighters remained neutral during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. After the occupation of Iraq, the U.S. military disarmed the MKO fighters and confined them inside their main camp known as Camp Ashraf.2 U.S. military sources told Human Rights Watch that as of March 10, 2005, there were 3,534 MKO members inside Camp Ashraf.3
Some MKO fighters took advantage of an amnesty offer by the Iranian government. Since October 2004, 273 MKO members have returned to Iran.4 The U.S. military has recognized the MKO fighters in Iraq as Protected Persons under the Geneva Conventions.5 Their fate remains uncertain; the Iraqi government and the U.S. military appear not to have reached a decision regarding their future.
During Saddam Hussein’s last year in power, some Iranians held in Abu Ghraib prison were repatriated to Iran in exchange for Iraqi prisoners of war (POWs). These were dissident members of the MKO who had been sent by the organization for “safekeeping” in Abu Ghraib.6 The release of these prisoners in 2002-2003 provided a direct window into conditions inside the MKO camps that was previously inaccessible to the outside world.
Human Rights Watch interviewed five of these former MKO members who were held in Abu Ghraib prison. Their testimonies, together with testimonies collected from seven other former MKO members, paint a grim picture of how the organization treated its members, particularly those who held dissenting opinions or expressed an intent to leave the organization.
The former MKO members reported abuses ranging from detention and persecution of ordinary members wishing to leave the organization, to lengthy solitary confinements, severe beatings, and torture of dissident members. The MKO held political dissidents in its internal prisons during the 1990s and later turned over many of them to Iraqi authorities, who held them in Abu Ghraib. In one case, Mohammad Hussein Sobhani was held in solitary confinement for eight-and-a-half years inside the MKO camps, from September 1992 to January 2001.
The witnesses reported two cases of deaths under interrogation. Three dissident members—Abbas Sadeghinejad, Ali Ghashghavi, and Alireza Mir Asgari—witnessed the death of a fellow dissident, Parviz Ahmadi, inside their prison cell in Camp Ashraf. Abbas Sadeghinejad told Human Rights Watch that he also witnessed the death of another prisoner, Ghorbanali Torabi, after Torabi was returned from an interrogation session to a prison cell that he shared with Sadeghinejad.
The MKO’s leadership consists of the husband and wife team of Masoud and Maryam Rajavi. Their marriage in 1985 was hailed by the organization as the beginning of a permanent “ideological revolution.”7 Various phases of this “revolution” include: divorce by decree of married couples, regular writings of self-criticism reports, renunciation of sexuality, and absolute mental and physical dedication to the leadership.8 The level of devotion expected of members was in stark display in 2003 when the French police arrested Maryam Rajavi in Paris. In protest, ten MKO members and sympathizers set themselves on fire in various European cities; two of them subsequently died.9 Former members cite the implementation of the “ideological revolution” as a major source of the psychological and physical abuses committed against the group’s members.
At present, the MKO is listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department and several European governments. The MKO’s leadership is engaged in an extensive campaign aimed at winning support from Western politicians in order to have the designation of a terrorist organization removed.10
Methodology
Human Rights Watch interviewed by telephone twelve former members of the MKO living in Europe. These witnesses provided credible claims that they were subjected to imprisonment as well as physical and psychological abuses because they had either expressed criticism of the MKO’s policies or had requested to leave the organization’s military camps.
Each witness was interviewed separately several times between February and May 2005. All witnesses are currently living in Europe. More than twelve hours of testimonies were collected. All interviews were conducted in Farsi. Each witness provided independent accounts of their experience inside the MKO camps, and their testimonies corroborated other evidence collected by Human Rights Watch. A number of witnesses who were detained and tortured inside the MKO camps named Hassan Ezati as one of their interrogators. Hassan Ezati’s son, Yasser Ezati, also interviewed for this report, confirmed his father’s identity as a MKO interrogator.
Of the twelve former MKO members interviewed for this report, eight witnesses11 left Iraq between 2002 and 2004. The remaining four witnesses12 left Iraq in the aftermath of the first Gulf War in 1991. In addition to being held in internal MKO prisons, five of the witnesses13 were imprisoned in Abu Ghraib prison prior to their release.
________________________________________
[1] For a comprehensive history of the organization, see Ervand Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).
[2] Camp Ashraf is located near the city of al-Khalis, north of Baghdad.
[3] Human Rights Watch e-mail interview with U.S. military officials, March 10, 2005.
[4] According to U.S. military sources, twenty-eight members were repatriated in December 2004, thirteen in January 2005, 100 on March 3, 2005, and 132 on March 9, 2005.
[5] “US grants protection for anti-Tehran group in Iraq,” Reuters, 26 July, 2004.
[6] Former MKO members who were held in Abu Ghraib prison told Human Rights Watch that their cell doors bore a plaque with “Mojahedin Safekeeping” [Amanat-e Mojahedin] written on it.
[7] Mojahed, No. 241, April 4, 1985. Mojahed is the official publication of the MKO, and at the time it appeared weekly.
[8] See Masoud Banisadr, Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel (London: Saqi Books, 2004). On self-criticism sessions, see pp. 210-230; on decreeing of divorce, see pgs. 307-311; on renunciation of sexuality, see pages 313-340. Immediately following Masoud and Maryam Rajavi’s marriage, the MKO military command issued a directive stating: “In order to carry out your organizational duties under the present circumstances there is an urgent need to strengthen and deepen this ideological revolution. You must pay the necessary price by allocating sufficient time and resources for absorbing related teachings…” Mojahed, No. 242, April 12, 1985. The Social Division of MKO also issued a directive to the members stating: “To understand this great revolution …is to understand and gain a deep insight into the greatness of our new leadership, meaning leadership of Masoud and Maryam. It is to believe in them as well as to show ideological and revolutionary obedience of them.” Mojahed, No. 242, April 12, 1985.
[9] Arifa Akbar, “Human torches mark protest; 10 Iranian exiles become fireballs, two die martyrs,” The Independent, July 2, 2003.
[10] Maryam Rajavi, “Empower Iran’s opposition forces checking the Mullahs,” International Herald Tribune, January 28, 2005. Katherine Shrader, “Iranian Group Seeks Legitimacy in U.S.,” Associated Press, February 24, 2005.
[11] Farhad Javaheri-Yar, Ali Ghashghavi, Mohammad Hussein Sobhani, and Akbar Akbari were repatriated by Iraqi officials to Iran on January 21, 2002. Amir Mowaseghi was repatriated on March 18, 2003. Alireza Mir Asgari was abandoned along the Iran-Iraq border in February 2003. Yasser Ezati left Iraq in June 2004. Abbas Sadeghinejad escaped the MKO military camp on June 20, 2002.
[12] Mohammad Reza Eskandari, Tahereh Eskandari, Habib Khorrami, and Karim Haqi.
[13] Farhad Javaheri-Yar, Ali Ghashghavi, Mohammad Hussein Sobhani, Akbar Akbari, and Amir Mowaseghi were imprisoned in Abu Ghraib.


II. Background
The MKO was founded in September 1965 by three graduates of Tehran University: Mohammad Hanifnezhad, Saeed Mohsen and Asghar Badizadegan.14 The three shared a history of political activism within the religious-nationalist movement and its affiliated Islamic Students Associations. They believed that opposition forces against the Pahlavi government lacked a cohesive ideology and required revolutionary leadership. They reasoned that peaceful resistance against the government was fruitless, and that only a revolutionary armed struggle could dislodge the monarchy.
The organization’s founding trio focused their initial thrust on creating a revolutionary ideology based on their interpretation of Islam that could fuel an armed struggle by persuading masses of people to rise up against the government. This ideology relied heavily on an interpretation of Islam as a revolutionary message compatible with modern revolutionary ideologies, particularly Marxism.
Initially, the founding members recruited some twenty like-minded friends to form a discussion group. Their first meeting, on September 6, 1965, in Tehran, is considered the genesis of the MKO. The group’s discussions centered on intense study of religion, history and revolutionary theory. In addition to religious texts, the group also studied Marxist theory at length. For its first three years, the group held regular secret meetings. By 1968, these discussions led to the creation of a Central Committee “to work out a revolutionary strategy” and an Ideological Team “to provide the group with its own theoretical handbooks.” 15
During its first five years, the MKO did not carry out any operations against the government. It primarily focused on developing a revolutionary ideology and training its members in urban guerilla warfare. In 1970, thirteen MKO members traveled to Jordan and Lebanon and received military training inside Palestinian Liberation Organization camps. They returned to Iran after a few months.
Prior to carrying out any armed activities, the group planned to focus on developing its ideology and training its new recruits. However, this strategy was thwarted by the emergence of a competing Marxist guerilla group, the Fadaian Khalq Organization. On February 8, 1971, members of the Fadaian launched their first operation by attacking a police station in the village of Siahkal in the northern province of Gilan. This incident marked the emergence of armed struggle against the shah’s government.
The MKO’s leadership, surprised by the Siahkal incident, decided to expedite their plans for armed operations by organizing a spectacular attack in Tehran. At this time, the government was in the midst of promoting a large-scale celebration marking 2500 years of monarchy in Iran. The MKO planned a series of bombings that would target Tehran’s electric power grids prior to the opening eve ceremonies.
During their efforts to acquire explosives, the MKO were infiltrated by the security forces who tracked their activities. On August 23, 1971, just days before the scheduled onset of their first operation, thirty-five members of the MKO were arrested by the authorities. Within the next few months, half of MKO’s member were arrested and put on trial by a military tribunal. “They were all accused of possessing arms, planning to overthrow the ‘constitutional monarchy,’ and studying such subversive authors as Marx, Mao, and Che Guevara.”16
The three founding members of the MKO, along with six others from the group’s Central Committee, were sentenced to death and executed on May 25, 1972. Only two members of the Central Committee, Masoud Rajavi and Bahman Bazargani, escaped firing squads when their death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment.
The 1971-72 waves of arrests, executions and imprisonments dealt a severe blow to the MKO, but its remaining members who escaped detection by the security forces continued to recruit new members as well as carrying out a number of armed operations. In 1975, intense ideological differences among the MKO members led to the departure of a sizable number of members, who argued that religious thought was incompatible with revolutionary struggle. This offshoot of the MKO was briefly known as the Marxist Mojahedin and was later renamed Peykar Organization. The MKO members who stayed loyal to the group’s original ideology referred to this event as an internal coup.
On the eve of the 1979 Iranian revolution, the imprisoned MKO members were released along with other political prisoners. The group quickly turned its attention to building a nation-wide organization. Masoud Rajavi emerged as the top MKO leader. The group was particularly successful in gaining the sympathies of middle class educated youth. It established offices throughout Iran and built a network of militia that were highly active inside university campuses and high schools.
While supporting the leadership of Khomeini in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, the MKO leaders never managed to gain his trust, and as a result were excluded from power-sharing arrangements in the post-revolutionary government. An intense rivalry developed between the MKO and the Islamic Republican Party (IRP), formed by Khomeini’s disciples.
The first president of the republic, Abol-Hasan Banisadr, elected in 1980, also faced serious opposition from the IRP. In the first months of 1981, differences among competing political factions reached a critical juncture. President Banisadr came under intense political pressure from the IRP, which controlled the parliament and most branches of the government and security forces. The MKO and Banisadr formed an alliance to try and thwart the IRP’s drive to consolidate its control over every part of the state.
The MKO started its armed conflict against the Iranian government on June 20, 1981. Thousands of its members inside Iran were imprisoned, tortured and executed during the 1980s.17 In 1988, the Iranian government summarily executed thousands of political prisoners, many of them MKO members.18
On June 19, 1981, Banisadr and Rajavi called for massive demonstrations nationwide. They hoped to duplicate the pattern of the anti-shah revolution by instigating a popular uprising. On June 20, 1981, large-scale street demonstrations were held in Tehran and many major cities. However the authorities used Revolutionary Guards to suppress the uprising, killing hundreds of demonstrators in street clashes.
In the aftermath of the June 20 uprising, the MKO was forced underground and both Banisadr and Rajavi went into hiding. A few weeks later, on July 29, 1981, Banisadr and Rajavi fled Iran and went into exile in Paris. From this point on, the MKO moved its headquarters to Paris and continued to fight the Iranian government by carrying out assassinations and bombings targeting government officials and the IRP leadership.19
In Paris, Rajavi and Banisadr consolidated their alliance by declaring the establishment of the National Council of Resistance (NCR) as a coalition of opposition forces, advertising itself as “the democratic alternative” to Iran’s government. The Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and a number of prominent intellectuals and individuals also joined the NCR.
However, the NCR’s role as a broad coalition was diminished within a year of its founding. Banisadr’s disagreements with Rajavi led to his departure in April 1984.20 The KDPI followed suit and withdrew in 1985.21 According to Masoud Banisadr, who served as the NCR’s chief representative in Europe and the United States until 1996, the NCR has since functioned primarily as the political wing of the MKO, serving the MKO’s lobbying efforts in Europe and North America:
It was obvious to everyone but ourselves that politically the Mojahedin had failed to create the broad coalition Rajavi had promised….We repeated to each other that the NCR was Rajavi’s means of staying on the political scene in Europe and America and nothing more. Its main use was to deceive the Americans and Europeans against thinking of us as the same Mojahedin responsible for assassinating American citizens in Iran…22
The MKO’s leadership was transformed when Masoud Rajavi announced his marriage to Maryam Uzdanlu on March 18, 1985.23 The husband and wife team became co-leaders of the MKO. The organization hailed their marriage as an “ideological revolution” that was the result of an immense sacrifice made by Masoud and Maryam Rajavi. Prior to this, Maryam Rajavi had been married to Masoud Rajavi’s deputy, Mehdi Abrishamchi. The leadership asked all its members to undertake their own “ideological revolution” by identifying their personal shortcomings in self-criticism sessions.24 Immediately following Masoud and Maryam Rajavi’s marriage, the military command of the MKO issued a directive stating:
In order to carry out your organizational duties under the present circumstances there is an urgent need to strengthen and deepen this ideological revolution. You must pay the necessary price by allocating sufficient time and resources for absorbing related teachings…Thus in your daily routines give priority to listening to radio messages and explanations provided by your commanders. Believe in the central committee’s proclamation that “this ideological revolution will enhance the Mojahedin’s capacities enormously; it will ever more unify and cleanse our ranks.”…Be certain that your deep belief in the novel leadership of the new democratic revolution of the heroic Iranian people, meaning Masoud and Maryam Rajavi, and by making a direct connection with this leadership and setting it as your example….you will be able to correct your work habits and be able to deal with and resolve personal, organizational, and military difficulties.25
The Social Division of MKO also issued a directive to the members initiating the self-criticism tradition within the organization:
To understand this great revolution…is to understand and gain a deep insight into the greatness of our new leadership, meaning the leadership of Masoud and Maryam. It is to believe in them as well as to show ideological and revolutionary obedience of them…By correcting your old work habits and by criticizing your individual as well as collective shortcomings, we shall gain much awareness in confronting our enemies…Report to your commanders and superiors in a comprehensive manner your progress, its results and outcomes that you gain from promoting and strengthening this ideological revolution.26
In 1986, the French government engaged in direct talks with the Iranian government to normalize ties. As a result of these negotiations, the French government asked Masoud Rajavi to leave France. On June 7, 1986, he left Paris for Baghdad. The MKO relocated many of its resources from Paris to Iraq. On June 20, 1987, the MKO announced the formation of National Liberation Army (NLA) inside Iraq.27 For the next year, the NLA made several incursions into Iran as the Iran-Iraq war was entering its eighth year. The largest operation, code-named “Eternal Light,” took place in the immediate aftermath of Iran’s acceptance of the U.N.-brokered cease fire agreement on July 18, 1988 (see below).28
After the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam Hussein limited the MKO’s military activities against Iran. The lack of military activity inside the MKO camps in Iraq coupled with an acceleration of the “ideological revolution” led to a rising tide of dissent inside the organization.
________________________________________
[14] “For the first time in the history of the Iranian people’s liberation struggle, an organization with a monolithic ideology, populist ideals, and a policy of revolutionary armed resistance was founded in September 1965.” Mojahedin Khalq Organization Bonyangozaran, downloaded on March 10, 2005, http://www.iran.mojahedin.org/books.htm. See alsoErvand Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin (New Haven: Yale University Press), 1989.
[15] Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, p. 89.
[16] Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin,
[17]“Iran: Violations of Human Rights 1987-1990,” Amnesty International, Index: MDE 13/2/90.
[18]“Iran: Political Executions,” Amnesty International, December 1988, Index: MDE 13/29/88. See also Ayatollah Montazeri’s letters protesting summary executions in 1988, published in his memoirs. Ayatollah Montazeri was Ayatollah Khomeini’s heir apparent in 1988. Ayatollah Montazeri, Khaterat, http://www.montazeri.ws/farsi/khaterat/fehrest.htm, last accessed March 18, 2005.
[19] Among the most spectacular attacks include the bombing of the IRP headquarters in June 28, 1981 and the assassination of President Mohammad Ali Rajai and Prime Minister Mohammad Javad Bahonar in 1981.
[20] “Khomeini’s Foes Split,” Washington Post, April 4, 1984.
[21] Mojahed, No. 240, March 14, 1985.
[22] Masoud Banisadr, Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel (London: Saqi Books, 2004), p. 219. Masoud Banisadr is a relative of former president Abolhasan Banisadr.
[23] Mojahed, No. 241, April 4, 1985.
[24] See footnote 8.
[25] Mojahed, No. 242, April 12, 1985.
[26] Ibid.
[27] “Iran rebels form Iraq-based army,” Chicago Sun-Times, June 20, 1987.
[28] “Iran accepts UN truce call in eight year war with Iraq,” Associated Press, July 19, 1988.

III. Rise of Dissent inside the MKO
Former MKO members interviewed for this report cite the following reasons for their decision to leave the organization: military failure of the MKO to dislodge the Iranian government during the July 1988 military operation, forced mass divorces instituted as part of the “ideological revolution” and their persecution and torture by the MKO operatives during “security clearances” in 1994-1995. These three developments are discussed below.
Operation Eternal Light
The MKO trained its fighters under the banner of the National Liberation Army (NLA) inside Iraq. The NLA established several military camps in Iraq and trained thousands of guerrilla fighters to fight against the Iranian regime.
During the Iran-Iraq war, the NLA fighters regularly attacked Iranian troops along the Iran-Iraq border and made several incursions into Iran. The largest operation by the NLA took place after Iran accepted U.N. resolution 598, calling for a ceasefire between Iran and Iraq. Iran accepted the U.N. resolution on July 18, 1988. The NLA forces, estimated at nearly 7,000 fighters, were immediately mobilized for an attack on Iran. This operation was named Eternal Light.
The MKO’s leadership, believing that the Iranian government was weak and susceptible to a popular uprising, reasoned that an incursion by the NLA forces would incite such an uprising and would pave the way for their forces to march to Tehran and bring down the government. On the eve of launching the operation, Masoud Rajavi told his troops:
We will not be fighting alone; we will have the people on our side. They are tired of this regime, and especially since the ceasefire, they have every incentive to get rid of it forever. We will only have to act as their shields, protecting them from being easy targets for the [revolutionary] guards. Wherever we go there will be masses of citizens joining us, and the prisoners we liberate from jails will help us lead them towards victory. It will be like an avalanche, growing as it progresses. Eventually the avalanche will tear Khomeini’s web apart. You don’t need to take anything with you. We will be like fish swimming in a sea of people. They will give you whatever you need.29
On July 24, 1988, the NLA fighters left their camps crossing the Iranian border at Khosravi checkpoint.30 They initially met little resistance as they approached the provincial capital of Kermanshah, nearly 100 miles inside Iranian territory. But Iran’s military and Revolutionary Guard responded massively to defend Kermanshah, forcing the NLA fighters to retreat towards the Iraqi border after suffering heavy losses.31 According to Masoud Banisadr:
About ten years later, when the organization published names and photographs of martyrs from the operation for the first time, the number of martyred was announced as 1,304. Our other losses were officially 1,100 injured, of whom 11 subsequently died.32
The NLA’s defeat was a defining moment for many of its fighters who realized their military might was far from sufficient to overthrow Iran’s government. “The level of pessimism and lack of trust in Rajavi’s leadership was rising daily. Many were asking to leave the organization. Our broken spirits and injured bodies were a sign of the NLA’s tactical and strategic defeat,” wrote Mohammad Reza Eskandari, another former MKO member who was injured during the operation.33
Masoud Banisadr also recalled the aftermath of the operation as a significant turning point for many MKO members:
Operation Forogh [Eternal Light] dashed our political hopes. Worse, it signified the end of ideology, of moral belief and expectation –for me and, as I soon discovered, many others. Our basic values no longer had any meaning and ceased to sustain us. We had all become actors playing to each other, encouraged by each other. This lie reached its intolerable climax when our “ideological leader” failed to admit his predictions and judgment had been wrong…once, we had been told that belief in Mojahedin was based on two premises: the sacrifice they were willing to make and their honesty. After Forogh the well of honesty completely dried up, and from then on the organization rested on only one foundation: “sacrifice” and more “sacrifice.”34
Compulsory Divorce
The “sacrifice” required of the members was articulated in a series of “ideological revolutions” promoted by the leadership.35 The leadership asked the members to divorce themselves from all physical and emotional attachments in order to enhance their “capacity for struggle.” In case of married couples, this phase of the “ideological revolution” required them to renounce their emotional ties to their spouses through divorce. Masoud Banisadr reports how this process unfolded during an “ideological meeting for ‘executive and high ranking members’” following MKO’s defeat in Iran:
The first thing I was required to do in Baghdad was watch a videotape of an ideological meeting for “executive and high-ranking members.” The meeting, called “Imam Zaman,”36 started with a simple question: “To whom do we owe all our achievements and everything that we have?”… Rajavi did not claim, as I thought he might, to be the Imam of our times, but merely said we owed everything to Imam Zaman… The object was to show that we could reach Tehran if we were more united with our leader, as he was with Imam Zaman and God. He was ready to sacrifice everything he had (which in fact meant all of us!) for God, asserting that the only thing on his mind was doing the will of God,….we were expected to draw the conclusion that no “buffer” existed between Rajavi and Imam Zaman; yet there was a buffer between ourselves and him [Rajavi] … which prevented us from seeing him clearly. This “buffer” was our weakness. If we could recognize that, we would see why and how we had failed in Operation Forogh [Eternal Light] and elsewhere. Masoud and Maryam [Rajavi] had no doubt that the buffer was in all our cases our existing spouse.37
The organization’s order for “mass divorce” caused much mental anguish and confusion. Masoud Banisadr details the atmosphere inside Ashraf Camp during this period:
The atmosphere on the base was completely different….The mood was one of unremitting misery…It seemed everyone was in the process of the new phase of the “ideological revolution.” The only legitimate discussion was about the revolution and the exchange of relevant experiences. Apart from that nothing was important; there was no outside world….Even poor single people were required to divorce their buffers, having no idea whom that meant; apparently the answer was to divorce all women or men for whom they harboured any feelings of love. Only later did I realize the organization demanded not only a legal divorce but also an emotional or “ideological” divorce. I would have to divorce Anna [his wife] in my heart. Indeed I would have to learn to hate her as the buffer standing between our leader and myself.
Rajavi announced at the meeting that as our “ideological leader” he had ordered mass divorce from our spouses. He asked everyone to hand over our rings if we had not already done so. That meeting was the strangest and most repugnant I had ever attended. It went on for almost a week….38
“Security Clearances”
During late 1994 and early 1995, many members of the MKO were arrested by the organization’s operatives inside their camps in Iraq. They were interrogated and accused of spying for the Iranian government. They were released in mid-1995 after being forced to sign false confessions and stating their loyalty to the leadership. Five former MKO members interviewed for this report were arrested during this period: Farhad Javaheri-Yar, Ali Ghashghavi, Alireza Mirasgari, Akbar Akbari, and Abbas Sadeghinejad. According to their testimonies—detailed in the next section—the purpose of these arrests was to intimidate dissidents and obtain false confessions from them stating that they were agents of Iranian government. This period was known as the “security clearance” (check-e amniyati).
In late 1994, the organization informed its fighters in Iraq of its plans to send small teams of fighters into Iran to carry out operations. Farhad Javaheri-Yar, a former member, told Human Rights Watch:
A message was broadcast on behalf of Masoud Rajavi stating that the domestic situation in Iran was chaotic. It called for volunteers who wanted to go inside Iran, perform revolutionary operations and instigate people to rise up. Many members responded immediately; long lines were formed by applicants. The application forms were nearly forty pages long and included hundreds of questions.39
Another former member, Alireza Mirasgari, told Human Rights Watch that discontent and dissent were spreading throughout Camp Ashraf at this time:
During the second half of 1994, the wave of questions and dissent was reaching a climax inside the organization. Since most military activities had stopped, there was little to do and much time to reflect. Many fighters wanted to leave the organization. I began to note that some people around me were “disappearing.” I was told they had left for special operations inside Iran. However, later we found out that they had been arrested and imprisoned inside the camp. I was myself imprisoned in January 1995.40
________________________________________
[29] Banisadr, Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, p. 283.
[30] “Incursion by rebels threaten cease-fire,” The Washington Post, July 30, 1988.
[31] “Rebels routed in push for Tehran,” The Guardian, September 6, 1988.
[32] Banisadr, Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, p. 292.
[33] Mohammad Reza Eskandari, Bar Ma Che Gozasht Khaterat Yek Mojahed (Paris: Kahvaran, 2004), p. 83.
[34] Banisadr, Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, p. 306.
[35] The concept of ideological revolution started with the “ideological marriage” of Masoud and Maryam Rajavi in 1985. Subsequently, the organization required all of its members to make an “ideological leap” by cleansing their character. This process required all members to write self-criticism reports outlining their character flaws and past mistakes. See footnote 8.
[36] Imam Zaman is the twelfth Shia Imam. According to the Shia Twelver belief, Imam Zaman is the Twelfth Imam in descent from the prophet Mohammad, who went into “occultation” in the Tenth century and will reappear on earth as a messiah at a time of God’s choosing.
[37] Banisadr, Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, p. 307.
[38] Banisadr, Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, p. 311.
[39] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Farhad Javaheri-Yar, February 3, 2005.
[40] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Alireza Mir Asgari, February 10, 2005.

IV. Human Rights Abuses in the MKO Camps
Human rights abuses carried out by MKO leaders against dissident members ranged from prolonged incommunicado and solitary confinement to beatings, verbal and psychological abuse, coerced confessions, threats of execution, and torture that in two cases led to death.
The testimonies of the former MKO members indicate that the organization used three types of detention facilities inside its camps in Iraq. The interviewees described one type as small residential units, referred to as guesthouses (mihmansara), inside the camps. The MKO members who requested to leave the organization were held in these units during much of which time they were kept incommunicado. They were not allowed to leave the premises of their unit, to meet or talk with anyone else in the camp, or to contact their relatives and friends in the outside world.
Karim Haqi, a former high ranking MKO member who served as the head of security for Masoud Rajavi, told Human Rights Watch:
I was the head of security for Masoud Rajavi in 1991. They could not believe that I wanted to separate from the organization. I was confined inside a building called Iskan together with my wife and our six month old child. Iskan was the site of a series of residential units that used to house married couples before ideological divorces were mandated. The organization had raised a tall wall around this area. Its interior perimeter was protected by barbed wire, and guards kept it under surveillance from observation towers. While we were under detention, the organization reduced our food rations, subjected us to beatings and verbal abuses and also intimidated us by making threats of executions.41
Mohammad Reza Eskandari and his wife Tahereh Eskandari, two former members of the MKO, also told Human Rights Watch of being detained inside various guest houses after requesting to leave the MKO in 1991:
The organization had taken our passports and identification documents upon our arrival in the camp. When we expressed our intention to leave, they never returned our documents. We were held in detention centers in Iskan as well as other locations. We were sent to a refugee camp outside the city of Ramadi called al-Tash. Life in al-Tash was extremely harsh, more like a process of gradual death. The MKO operatives continued to harass us even in Al-Tash. Eventually in September 1992, we received refugee status from Holland and were able to leave al-Tash.42
The second type of detention inside the MKO camps was called bangali shodan by the witnesses, referring to solitary confinement inside a small pre-fabricated trailer room (bangal). Dissident members who requested to leave the organization as well as ordinary members were detained in the bangals. Detention inside a bangal was considered a form of MKO punishment for members whom the leadership considered to have made mistakes. They were expected to reflect on their mistakes and to write self-criticism reports while in detention.
Masoud Banisadr, formerly the top diplomatic representative of the MKO in Europe and North America, wrote of his experience of being detained in a bangal when Masoud Rajavi and other high-ranking members met with him and decided he had been “corrupted:”
Afterwards my masoul [supervisor] advised me to go to a bungalow and think. I had become a bangali, which meant being put in solitary confinement, ordered to do nothing but think and write. It was an extreme kind of mental torture, and there were members who preferred to kill themselves than to suffer it.43
The third type of detention reported by the witnesses encompassed imprisonment, physical torture and interrogations inside secret prisons within the MKO camps. These prisons were primarily used for persecution of political dissidents. Their existence was unknown to most members. The witnesses who suffered under this form of detention told Human Rights Watch that they were unaware that the organization maintained such prisons until they experienced it firsthand.
One of the witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch, Mohammad Hussein Sobhani, spent eight-and-a-half years in solitary confinement, from September 1992 to January 2001, inside the MKO camps. Another witness, Javaheri-Yar, underwent five years of solitary confinement in the MKO prisons, from November 1995 to December 2000. Both were high-ranking members who intended to leave the organization but were told that, because of their extensive inside knowledge, they could not be allowed to do so. They were imprisoned and eventually transferred to the Iraqi authorities, who then held them in Abu Ghraib.
Four other witnesses Human Rights Watch interviewed were detained during the “security clearances” of 1994-1995 because they were suspected by the MKO of harboring dissident views. Ali Ghasghavi, Alireza Mir Asgari, Ali Akbari, and Abbas Sadeghinejad were severely tortured, subjected to harsh interrogation techniques and forced to sign false confessions stating their links to Iranian intelligence agents.
Abbas Sadeghinejad, Ali Ghashghavi, and Alireza Mir Asgari, three former members of MKO interviewed by Human Rights Watch, witnessed the death of Parviz Ahmadi in February 1995 inside an internal MKO prison in Iraq.44 The three shared a prison cell during the security clearance arrests in February 1995. Parviz Ahmadi was a dissident member who was held in the same cell. Ali Ghashghavi told Human Rights Watch that Parviz Ahmadi was taken for interrogations on his second day of being held in the prison cell:
It was the start of Ramadan [February 1995] when the prison guards came to fetch Parviz Ahmadi. He was gone for a couple of hours. When they brought him back he was badly beaten and died soon afterwards.
Abbas Sadeghinezhad, who was also present in the cell, recalled the final moments of Parviz Ahmadi’s life:
The prison door opened, and a prisoner was thrown into the cell. He fell on his face. At first we didn’t recognize him. He was beaten up severely. We turned him around; it was Parviz Ahmadi taken for interrogations just a few hours before. Ahmadi was a unit commander. His bones were broken all over, his legs were inflamed; he was falling into a coma. We tried to help him but after only ten minutes he died as I was holding his head on my lap. The prison guard opened the door and pulled Ahmadi’s lifeless body out.45
Alireza Mir Asgari, who was also present, corroborated the circumstances of Parviz Ahmadi’s death.46 In contrast, the MKO’s publication Mojahed of March 2, 1998, lists Parviz Ahmadi as an MKO “martyr” killed by Iranian intelligence agents.47
Abbas Sadeghinejad told Human Rights Watch that he had earlier witnessed the death of another prisoner, Ghorbanali Torabi, after Torabi was returned from an interrogation session to a prison cell that he shared with Sadeghinejad.48
________________________________________
[41] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Karim Haqi, February 11, 2005.
[42] Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with Mohammad Reza Eskandari and Tahereh Eskandari, February 1, 2005 and February 10, 2005.
[43] Banisadr, Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, p. 388.
[44] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Abbas Sadeghinejad, February 14, 2005. Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Ali Ghashghavi, February 9, 2005 and May 6, 2005. Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Alireza Mir Asgari, February 10, 2005.
[45] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Abbas Sadeghinejad, February 14, 2005.
[46] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Alireza Mir Asgari, February 10, 2005.
[47] Mojahed, No. 380, March 2, 1998 (on file with Human Rights Watch).
[48] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Abbas Sadeghinejad, February 14, 2005.

V. Testimonies
Mohammad Hussein Sobhani
Mohammad Hussein Sobhani spent eight-and-a-half years in solitary confinement inside the MKO’s main camp in Iraq, Camp Ashraf, from September 1992 to January 2001. He was subsequently held in Abu Ghraib prison and left Iraq in 2002.49
Sobhani first came in contact with the MKO in 1977, a year before the anti-monarchy revolution. By 1979, he was working “professionally and full time” with the organization. When the headquarters of the armed wing of the organization relocated inside Iraq, he followed suit. By 1991, he had risen in the ranks of the organization and had become a member of the Central Committee. However, ever since the “ideological revolution,” when divorces were mandated, he became uncomfortable with the path pursued by the leadership. His differences with the leadership of Masoud and Maryam Rajavi and other members of the Central Committee reached a climax in 1992. Masoud Rajavi argued for remaining in Iraq regardless of the end of the Iran-Iraq war and Saddam Hussein’s defeat in the first Gulf War in 1991, he said. Rajavi still hoped that fighting between Iran and Iraq would resume, and based the organization’s strategy on such a development. Sobhani says he found the possibility of a new war highly unlikely given the dismal state of Iraq’s armed forces. Other members of the Central Committee saw his arguments as a challenge to the Rajavis’ leadership:
As long as my criticisms were mild, I was left alone. But as soon as I persevered in my questioning, their behavior changed dramatically. In the beginning, I discussed my concerns personally with the leadership, Maryam and Masoud Rajavi. I also brought up my concerns with other members of the Central Committee. These discussions reached a dead-end. Once they became certain that I didn’t share their views, on August 28, 1992, they convened a meeting (neshast taiin taklif) to determine my faith and to decide if I was staying with the organization or not. The process began with intimidation, verbal abuse, and beatings. Of course, since I was a high ranking official I was treated better than ordinary members. I was told that my criticisms and questions were just an excuse to quit the struggle. Their conclusion was that I was a quitter (borideh) and didn’t have the strength to continue the struggle any longer.50
On August 31, 1992, Sobhani was moved to a prison and kept under solitary confinement for the next eight-and-a-half years.
After the first two months in prison, all of my beliefs in the organization fell apart. Up to that point I considered my differences with them as a matter of divergent political views; I wasn’t questioning the MKO’s underlying essence. I used to mark my prison walls each time I was subjected to severe beatings. There were many occasions of lesser beatings, but on eleven occasions I was beaten mercilessly using wooden sticks and thick leather belts.51
Sobhani was handed over to Iraqi officials in January 2001. He spent one month in mukhabarat prison and then transferred to Abu Ghraib. He was held in Abu Ghraib until January 21, 2002, when he was repatriated to Iran in exchange for Iraqi POWs. In Iran, he was detained and interrogated by the Iranian government. After three days, he escaped from a low security detention center and fled Iran. He is currently living in Europe.
Yasser Ezati
Yasser Ezati was born on May 27, 1980, to Hasan Ezati and Akram Ghadim-al-ayam. He said that his father, also known as Nariman, was a well-known interrogator inside the MKO prisons. Yasser’s mother died during one of the MKO’s military operations.52
Ezati moved to Iraq with his family at the age of three and grew up inside the MKO military camps. During the 1991 Gulf war, Ezati and other children inside the camps were separated from their parents and sent outside Iraq. During the next three years, Ezati lived with three different families in Canada. These families were MKO sympathizers. In the summer of 1994, the MKO moved Ezati to Cologne, Germany, where he lived in a group-house for the MKO children. The organization recruited Ezati for military training when he was seventeen years old and sent him to Iraq in June 1997.
After the first six months in Iraq, I realized I had no desire to stay. In Europe I had an image of a democratic organization, but in Iraq I realized the extent of censorship and control. I wanted to leave. I was repeatedly told the only way out was to go to Iran. I was too afraid to go to Iran.53
Ezati was extremely uncomfortable with the many means of thought control enforced inside the camps. He said there were many gatherings where high ranking officials lectured members not to think of any issue except those relating to internal MKO operations. “We had to write self-criticism reports on a regular basis. If we had any thoughts outside of the organizational framework we had to report them,” he said. Ezati’s most daunting experience took place in summer of 2001:
It was a gathering called to’emeh [lure, or bait] that lasted four consecutive months. All of the camp members were present during these sessions. At this time the number of dissidents who wanted to leave the organization was growing daily. First, Masoud Rajavi talked about the Mojahedin’s basic ideology. He then talked about the organization’s strategy, and finally he addressed the issue of those members wishing to separate from the organization. His purpose was to intimidate members and to say that anyone who wants to leave is a traitor. These sessions were held from morning to evening. Dissident members were brought in front of the audience and forced to self-criticize their actions and thoughts. They were expected to conclude by
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