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How To Combat Islamist Terrorism Without Combating Islam?

November 06, 2003
Iran va Jahan
Mehdi Mozaffari



The laconic answer to this question would be: 'that it is not an easy task but a highly compelling one'. The issue is far too complicated to be answered laconically. Let me begin with a reformulation of the above question.

Why It Is Necessary To Combat Islamist Terrorism Without Combating Islam? Or

Why Not Combat Both At The Same Time?

Three reasons explain the impossibility of such an enterprise:

First, it does not represent the issue,
Second, it is not feasible, and
Third, it is not a wise approach.

We are not facing a religious war. The issue is not war between Islam on the one side and the rest of the world on the other. Neither is it a war that Islam has launched against Christianity or the Western hemisphere. If we take the Clash of Civilization's thesis, it is a fact that Islam as such does not represent a civilization any more. Islamic civilization extinguished many centuries ago; the remainders of which is merely a religion.

Even if we wished to combat Islam as a religion, it is simply not feasible. As a religion, Islam like many other religions is elusive in its nature, has different interpretations and multiple faces. Where can we find Islam? In the Koran, of course. Should we burn the Koran? Should we abolish Islam? Who can abolish a religion and how? Some regimes, for example the USSR and Mao's China tried to restrict Islamic as well as other religious practices. Not only did this policy fail dramatically, it also produced a boomerang effect. As a formidable reaction, the faith in religion rose enormously.

It is not wise to combat Islam as a religion either. It is not a fertile policy. We must leave this battle to theologians from different religions. Politics is not theology. Confusing politics with theology is precisely what Islamists are doing, hoping that we will follow the same path. This is a trap we must absolutely avoid, if we wish to combat Islamists successfully.

After this refutation, I would like to open a short discussion on major and substantial conceptual differences between Islam and Islamism.

Islam is a religion with a long history and with different theological and juridical schools. The Koran is not really a coherent book able to provide Muslims with clear and unambiguous guidelines. Roughly speaking, it is divided into two very different and somewhat contradictory set of statements, principles and commandments. You have the Mekka period of 12 years length (from 610 to 622), and the Medina Period of 10 years length (from 622 to 632). The first and inaugurative period is characterized by relative moderation, toleration and pluralism. You find this aspect of Islam in some verses in The Koran. For example the Koran states:

"You shall have your religion and I shall have my religion" - (109.6).

We may call the Mekka period the software of Islam. In contrast, the Medina period is essentially characterized by politics, power and war. The moderate and open-minded language and behaviour gives place to a power language. The following verse shows the change in the Koran's language when it states:

"And kill them wherever you find them, and drive them out from whence they drove you out, and persecution is severer than slaughter, and do not fight with them at the Sacred Mosque until they fight with you in it, but if they do fight you, then slay them; such is the recompense of the unbelievers" - ( 2.191).

The Medina period represents in reality the hardware of Islam. The Koran also reflects this part of Islam. This example is an illustration of the Koran's ambiguous discourse and its ambivalence in recommended behaviour. The fact is that some Muslims are referring to the Mekka period alone, and others to the Medina period alone. Then there is a third group which refers to both periods. This consideration among many others demonstrates that it is practically impossible to identify the real message of Islam. Therefore, the world is facing various aspects of Islam without reaching a consensus among Muslims. Except for two cardinal, thus very general points; the acceptance of the unity of God (Allah), and the rightness of the prophecy of Muhammad as the last Prophet.

This means that if we take only the Koran, which is the main source of Islam and which should be the point of convergence between Muslims, it leads us to further confusion about Islam. If we add to the Koran, other sources of Islamic creed as for example Sunna, Hadith, Rivaya, Fatwas and so on, we get more than one billion disoriented and confused peoples! All Muslims, thus from different obedience. All and each of them are convinced that their own version and their own understanding of Islam represent the only truth.

While Islam is too general, too elusive and too ambiguous, Islamism represents a coherent, specific and identifiable construction. Islamism is 'an ideology bearing a holistic vision of Islam whose final aim is the conquest of the world with all means'. Its vision is holistic and based on the absolute indivisibility of the trinity (Dîn, Dunya and Dwala), which means Religion, Way of life, and State. This indivisibility is permanent and eternal. Its ultimate goal boils down to the fulfilment of this said trinity on a global scale. Furthermore, Islamists define themselves often as 'Islamiyyoun/Islamists' precisely to differentiate themselves from 'Muslimun/Muslims'. In short, Islamism is a totalitarian ideology comparable to Communism, Nazism and Fascism. Some scholars are debating on weather it will be adequate to call Communism a 'political religion' in contrast to Democracy which in J.J. Rousseau's terminology represents being a 'civil religion'. The point is that Islamism represents a perfect model of a 'political religion' or even more correctly, Islamism is a 'religious ideology'.

Furthermore, Islamism's ideal reference model is exclusively the Medina model, leaving aside the Mekka model.

Without going through an elaborate comparative analysis between western totalitarianism (Communism, Nazism and Fascism) and, let us say, oriental totalitarianism (Islamism), let me just mention some of the main similarities between them.

They are all violent. They all believe in the Führerprinzip; the cult of a mythical leader with superman capacities. They are all anti-democratic. They are all 'world Conquerors'. Historically, they are all in different ways one of the major consequences of the First World War.

There is an ongoing debate about the solidity of Islamists. Are they all totalitarian, violent and pursuing the same goal: conquest of the world? Some experts think that there are moderate Islamists and there are radical Islamists. Consequently, there must be two different policies or strategies depending on the character of each of these two groups. To answer this question, we have to make a double distinction:

A distinction in the scope of the goal, and a distinction in terms of the use of violence.

The first distinction leads to identify two categories of Islamists: The 'National Islamists' and the 'Global Islamists'. Both groups are sharing the same ideology; but the scope of the goal is not the same. The scope of the goal of groups such as Hamas, Palestinian Jihad, Lebanese Hizbullah as well as Islamists in Chechnya, in the Philippines and in Kashmir is geographically limited. These groups are struggling for a limited political goal, namely autonomy or independence. Conquest of the world or establishment of a global Caliphate does not really figure on their agenda. In general, terrorist actions undertaken from such groups are also limited to their own territories and their neighbouring states.

In contrast to these groups, there are the 'Global Islamists'; those who firmly believe in a world revolution and the instauration of a global Islamic government. Groups such as Al-Qaeda (of course), Jama' al-Islamiyya and the Jihad organisations in Egypt, Al-Muhajiroun, Hiz ul-Tahrir and so on belong to this category. At the same time, states such as the Islamic Republic of Iran and in some degree Saudi Arabia are ideologically global Islamists. The difference between these two states lies in their official political attitude towards the West in general and vis-à-vis the USA in particular. If you want to find out who is the current 'Leader of the World', you may simply click on to: www.khomeini.com which is one of the official sites of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Here, Ayatollah Khamenei (not to be confused with Khomeini) is represented as the Leader of the World.

The second distinction is about the use or non-use of violence. For practical reasons, we can divide these groups into two categories: The Maximalists and the Gradualists.

The former are actively and violently working for their final objective. The latter are active too; thus not violently. Groups such as Ikhwan al-Muslimin which represents an archetype model for an Islamist ideology or Hizbul Tahrir have chosen a progressive strategy. They did not eliminate the use of force from their working plan; they only postponed it to a more opportune future. This category of Islamists is providing volunteers to the Maximalists.

I would now like shortly to go through the evolution of Islamist terrorism. In this respect, three different and successive phases are identified and labelled as follows:

1. The era of Hassan al-Banna (1928-1978)
2. The era of Khomeini (1978-1991)
3. The era of Bin Laden (from 1991).

The major characteristics of the first period are the following:

Terrorist acts were directed right at their beginning, exclusively against Muslims. In other words, during this particular period, Islamist terrorism was an internal terrorism. According to our investigations, no assassination attempts were committed by Islamists in Western countries. Not even against Muslims living in these countries. In addition, Islamist terrorism was not destined to spread terror but rather to eliminate political adversaries. Political assassination was used in order to destabilize regimes in power judged by Islamists as being corrupt and accused of being puppet governments. In some cases 'heretical' Muslims were eliminated by Islamists.

The second phase of Islamist terrorism starts off with the Islamist revolution in Iran. It was the first time Islamists were acceding to power. Let us now examine the major aspects of this phase.

First of all Islamist terrorism altered. Up to this period, the terrorist acts of the Islamists were carefully selected and personalized avoiding any repercussions on civilians. This line of conduct was interrupted in 1978 in the process of the Islamist revolution. In order to bring about chaos in Iran and in order to destabilize the regime of the Shah, Islamists put a movie theatre on fire (August 18th 1978) in the Rex cinema of Abadan (oil-producing city). About 400 people were killed. This tragic event was in fact the starting point of a new tactic: to attack and assassinate civilian as well as military persons. From then on Islamist terrorism turns into a blind, generalized and non-discriminatory terrorism. The consequences of which have been boundless and tragic on a regional and world-scale: in Lebanon as well as in New York and Washington D.C.

The third age of Islamist terrorism is the most critical and spectacular of all. In this phase, terrorist acts remain indiscriminate, non-selective and suicidal. Bin Laden's terrorism is not that much different from the one used in the second phase although it appears to be. What differentiates it is its highly spectacular aspect and that the field of action takes place on American soil. Those acts were spectacular in terms of the implacable organizational capability and coordination they revealed, as well as the extension of their networks. It was also spectacular in terms of human casualties and material damages. Finally, it was particularly spectacular in its symbolic aspect through the choice of the targets: the USA as the most powerful country in the world and human history, the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and the missed target: probably the White House.

Until now, I have explained why it is unwise and almost impossible to combat Islam. Now, I turn to the heart of the question: How to combat Islamism without combating Islam.

First, we need a cognitive approach to Islamism by conceiving it as a totalitarian ideology. A clear and full internalization of the fact that Islamism is an ideology and not a religion will purify the whole question from a variety of difficulties. In many ways, Islamism is like an octopus. We have to aim directly at the head in stead of wasting our time and energy to deal with the complicated body. By evacuating religious contents from Islamism, we change our direction from theology to ideology, from religion to politics. In this way, we put forward the real face and real nature of Islamism. The Muslims, especially among the young people, who are potentially ready to give their lives for the sake of Islamist ideals, will find out that their struggle is not a part of a religious duty but purely an ideological and political one emanating from a dangerous utopia.

Second, we need an international tactical or ethical consensus. This is especially needed in the Western hemisphere. The reason for such a consensus is motivated by the fact that often some western political parties and leaders use anti-Islamic rhetoric for political purposes. This policy is not productive, and it can be dangerous. Attacking Islam is precisely what Islamists are waiting for. They are insatiably trying to convince Muslims of two things: 1) Islamism is the true face of Islam, and 2) the west is an enemy of Islam. Therefore, politicians must choose their vocabulary more carefully by avoiding attacks on Islam as a religion and by avoiding hostile remarks about Muslims in general. Americans became aware of this necessity and consequently transformed their language in this field. They talk about "terrorists who hijacked a religion" and rarely on Islam or Muslims in a negative way. We have to remember that Islamists are still today using President Bush's famous "crusade" pronounced in September 2001 as an evidence for American hostility against Islam. It seems that to avoid attacking Islam and Muslims, indiscriminately, has become general US policy. In this respect, the most recent evidence are the apologies which a top Pentagon intelligence official, Lt. General William Boykin, offers (October 17, 2003) to Muslims because of his negative comments on Islam. The Americans' prudence is re-affirmed in President Bush's speech in Indonesia (October 22, 2003). In an elaborated and well-balanced speech, the President repeated that "Americans hold a deep respect for the Islamic faith. We know that Islam is fully compatible with liberty and tolerance and progress because we see the proof in your country [Inodonesia]". Then, he states "Terrorists who claim Islam as their inspiration defile one of the great faiths. Murder has no place in any religious tradition". In this way, President Bush tried to reach two important goals: To make a clear distinction between 'Islam' and 'Islamism' and to demonstrate that Islamists have hijacked Islam itself.

Third, during the past decades, repetitive experiences have showed that dialogue with Islamists leads nowhere. While in a democratic culture, dialogue is a MUST and a natural process. In contrast, Islamists consider dialogue a clear sign of weakness; their own weakness if they accept a dialogue, and especially weakness in their opponents. Dialogue is an unknown word for Islamists. Nothing positive has come out of different dialogues of diplomacy with totalitarian regimes and groups in general, and nothing positive with Islamists either. The Chamberlain and Hitler agreement, the Roosevelt and Stalin dialogue, the European Union's "critical dialogue", the "constructive dialogue", the "Iran gate", the "dialogue" with Taliban and so on and so forth. None of these attempts at dialogue have been successful for the Western diplomacy.

Fourth, if the dialogue or compromise is impossible and ineffective, what to do then? The answer is short and brutal: pressure! Pressure can be gradual or accumulated; but it must be real and sufficiently strong and consistent for Islamists to feel it as such. If the pressure has no positive effect- as it was the case with Taliban - war should not be excluded as a last resort.

Therefore, we must constantly remember and learn from previous, related experiences to deal with other totalitarian regimes, groups and ideologies. They were defeated either by war or by heavy pressure. This goes for Nazism and Fascism. It also goes for the breakdown of the USSR. Based on criteria of success, it will be wise to forget any possible arrangement with Islamists and start using systematical force and pressure.

Finally, it is necessary and urgent that the whole problematic around Islam changes its current orientation. After the end of the Cold War and especially in the post - 9/11 era, what is predominately important is democratization of the world. If there is a clash, the clash is not between civilizations or between religions. The real clash occurs between democracy and despotism.

It means that democratization of the Muslim world stands as the key word to combat Islamism and with it to combat current global terrorism. It represents a huge and vast task. Let me emphasize only one aspect of this problematic, which I think is the most important. The Islamic world is producing three main things: Oil, Terrorism and Emigration. Thus, we have an Islamic Bermuda Triangle which is threatening peace and security in the world. The best way to break down this Bermuda Triangle is of course to do it within the Muslim world and by Muslims themselves. Unfortunately, democratic forces inside the Muslim world have not been able to break this Triangle. Therefore, external support is essential. To support democratic forces inside the Muslim world is an inherent and necessary part of the anti-terrorism war. External support can take different forms: conditioning economic aids to improving human rights and democracy is the first step. Awarding the Nobel Peace Price to a Muslim and Iranian woman (Shirin Ebadi) is an elegant and hopefully efficient stimulus. In extreme case, military intervention cannot be avoided. The ongoing war in Iraq - despite its doubtful legal foundations - represents a method to break down the Islamic Bermuda Triangle. In this sense, the war in Iraq is a 'strategic war' against the roots of terrorism, while the war in Afghanistan stands mostly as an 'operational war' or simply a 'theâtre d'opérations'.

When combating Islamism, one of the main problems and difficulties is how to deal with millions of Muslims who are living in Western countries. Starting from the facts, it is apparent that Muslims in western countries are far too dispersed to constitute a compact bloc. In terms of social, cultural, political and religious orientations, the division among them is deep and real. Roughly, Muslims are divided into two large categories: Muslim Believers and Cultural Muslims. Islamists are predominantly issued from the first category. Cultural Muslims represent an agglomerate of peoples embracing agnostics, liberals, socialists and so on. In general, Cultural Muslims do not represent any tangible threat. The attention therefore must be oriented to the Muslim Believers who roughly are divided into Moderates and Radicals. Both are potential sources for Islamism; the former lesser than the latter. Now, how to identify a Radical Muslim today in the Western countries? In this regard, there are a number of helpful indices. First, a Radical Muslim is of course a believer, who practices the rituals of Islam. But, this alone is not enough. A Radical Muslim is a Man (rarely a woman. Perhaps because Prophet Muhammad expressed his skepticism over women's capacity to hold a secret!). A Radical Muslim is constantly in communication with others. He can be a lonely man in the city and locality where he lives, but with permanent communication with the outside world. Communication goes through mail, e-mail, fax, telephone (mobile and public) and so on. He is also a man who reads much and is generally a quiet person carefully avoiding clashes with the police and other public authorities. He is also traveler, a globetrotter! He is a young man with an average age of 25-27 years. In Southern Europe, Radical Muslims are issued from North Africa (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia). In the U.K. essentially from Pakistan. In Scandinavia, from Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt and Pakistan. Iranian Islamists are working under the auspices of Iranian authorities, generally as diplomatic personnel or as business persons.

Conclusion

Today, the world is facing a single global terrorism, which is Islamist. In my analysis, I did not approach the force of the global terrorism. I took it as a given fact. Islamist terrorism is perhaps not as powerful as some people would imagine. However, according to Institute for Strategic Studies (in London), Islamist terrorism has been reinforced following the war on Iraq (October Report 2003). We may say that global terrorism at least appears as a huge troublemaker. In this study, I tried to demonstrate that the real danger lies somewhere else. Islamist terrorism is the expression of a totalitarian ideology. Therefore, the world is facing a new totalitarianism, which has been neglected for decades. Consequently, combating Islamist terrorism cannot be reduced to a simple classic counter-terrorism. Classic Counter-terrorism's highly necessary efforts and investigations must be accompanied by coherent political, cultural and economic actions.

In short, my propositions to combating Islamist terrorism without combating Islam are resumed in the three following points:

- Continuous pressure on Islamists and, if necessary, conduct of war;
- Dialogue and cooperation with moderate Muslims, and
- Effective support to democratic forces inside the Muslim world.


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Terrorism - Challenges and Possible Consequences
Copenhagen, 3-4 November 2003

Mehdi Mozaffari
Department of Political Science
University of Aarhus
Denmark
mehdi@ps.au.dk
_________________
Referendum AFTER Regime Change

"I'm ready to die for you to be able to say your own opinions, even if i strongly disagree with you" (Voltaire)